Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach and Nonhuman Animals: Theory

AUTHOR:Ramona Ilea ABSTRACT: In the last thirty years many philosophers, such as Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Cora Diamond, have argued in favor of a better treatment of nonhuman animals from a variety of perspectives, including utilitarian, rights, virtue ethics, and Wittgensteinian.1 In her recently published book, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership,2 Martha Nussbaum argues that her theory, called “the capabilities approach,” offers a better philosophical alternative to these perspectives and provides philosophical principles that will form the basis of strong and long-lasting animal protection public policies. My aim in this article is to assess both the philosophical merits of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and its potential to affect public policy. I will begin the article by giving a very brief overview of the capabilities approach, and then explain how Nussbaum has extended it to include nonhuman animals. I will then argue that there are currently three main philosophical problems with the theory that need further attention. I will end by proposing a way to deal with these problems, and by showing how the capabilities approach has the potential to affect changes in public policy.

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